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A MATTER OF DIRECTION: THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION, THE SIGNING STATEMENT, AND THE
1986 WESTLAW DECISION
Christopher S. Kelley*
The presidential signing statement has received a great deal of attention since
an April 30, 2006, Boston Globe story told of President George W. Bush using it to
challenge the constitutionality of over 750 provisions of law.' As a result, the Senate2
and House 3 Judiciary Committees held a hearing on the signing statement, four sepa-
rate bills were introduced in an attempt to blunt its effect,4 and various outside interest
groups released statements condemning its use.
Despite all of the heated attention directed towards the current administration and
its use of the signing statement, it was not the first to use the signing statement. In fact,
the signing statement has roots nearly as deep as the Republic.
The signing statement was first utilized in the Monroe administration to protect
the President's Commander-in-Chief prerogative.6 The device did not come into regu-
lar use, however, until the period following Watergate, when it was used routinely by
the Ford and Carter administrations to nullify legislative vetoes7 and drew its first
reaction from Congress. In 1978, Congressman Elliot Levitas (D-GA) added language
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Miami University,
Oxford, Ohio.
' Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30,2006,
at Al.
2 The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
' Presidential Signing Statements Under the Bush Administration: A Threat to Checks
and Balances and the Rule of Law?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007).
' S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.J. Res. 89, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.J. Res. 87, 109th
Cong. (2006); H.R. 5486, 109th Cong. (2006).
' See AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POwERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abajfinal-signing-statements recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf; The Consti-
tution Project, Statement on Presidential Signing Statements by the Coalition to Defend
Checks and Balances (July 27, 2006) http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Statementon
_PresidentialSigningStatements.pdf.
6 Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 57
(2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University), available athttp://www.ohiolink
.edu/etd/view.cgi?miami 1057716977.
7 Id. at 73-77.
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to an appropriations bill that required the Attorney General to inform Congress
whenever he refused to defend a challenge to a legislative veto.8
But it was the Reagan administration that developed the signing statement into
a strategic weapon, part of a set of "power tools" the President could rely upon
when needed.' Thus, the purpose of this Article is to provide a complete and detailed
understanding of the decision by the Reagan administration to add the signing
statement to the legislative history of bills signed into law. While many believe that
the Reagan administration's purpose for the signing statement was to affect judicial
decisionmaking, l° I will demonstrate that the decision was designed to influence the
administrative agencies as much, if not more, than to influence judges.
I. WHAT IS A SIGNING STATEMENT?
Before telling the story of the Westlaw decision, it is important to understand
precisely what a signing statement is in order to understand its importance to the
President. The signing statement is a document the President appends to a bill he has
signed into law. The signing statement may be both written and spoken, as when the
President calls together members of Congress or other important individuals who have
helped pass the legislation he has signed. Mostly, signing statements are informal and
only written, akin to a press release. The actual document that is the signing statement
does not hold much interest to scholars studying the presidency. It is what is contained
in the document-the "devil in the details"-that is important.
There are four different uses for the presidential signing statement--either non-
constitutional or constitutional. The first use, and the only one not justified by in-
terpreting the Constitution, is the rhetorical signing statement." The rhetorical signing
statement, by far the most common use of a signing statement, is used to garner the
attention of the press, important political constituencies, Congress, and/or the public.
8 2 U.S.C. § 288(e) (2000).
9 Professor Phillip Cooper classified such devices as the signing statement, executive
order, and executive agreements because of their utility to respond to a variety of problems
or issues that a President faced. See Phillip Cooper, Power Tools for an Effective and
Responsible Presidency, 29 ADMIN. & Soc'Y. 529, 531-56 (1997).
10 See, e.g., Mark Johnson Boulris, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's
Interpretation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination
Provision: A Circumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1057 (1987); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing
Statements As Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power,
24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987); Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?:
Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal
Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 475 (1997).
" For further discussion of this device, see SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW
STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (1997); JEFFREY TuLIs, THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY (1998).
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For instance, the President will thank particular members of Congress for help on
a bill, or he will use it to scorn Congress for sloppy or irresponsible work. 2 One study
has found that the number of signing statements responds positively to the presence
of a federal election, going up during a presidential or midterm election and falling
during off-year elections. 3
The second, third, and fourth uses for the signing statement involve interpreting
the Constitution. They either rely upon the Oath Clause or the Take Care Clause in
Article ]I. 14
The second use for the signing statement, and one that stems from the President's
oath to protect and defend the Office of the Presidency as well as the Constitution,
involves the President challenging provisions of a bill he deems unconstitutional. 5
In this type of signing statement, the President can simply urge Congress to fix the
defective provision(s) before the law takes effect, or he will inform Congress that
he will not defend the provision if challenged. For instance, in a 1943 appropriations
bill, Congress added language that punished three State Department employees 6 who
Congress determined were "irresponsible, unrepresentative, crackpot, radical bureau-
crats.""7 When President Roosevelt signed the bill, he argued that the provision repre-
sented a bill of attainder, was an "unwarranted encroachment upon the authority of
both the executive and the judicial branches under our Constitution," and was not
binding. 8 Because the bill funded important wartime programs, Roosevelt was boxed
into a comer and thus could not veto the bill. The employees challenged their termi-
nation, and when the suit went before the courts, the Roosevelt administration re-
fused to defend the provision, requiring Congress to hire counsel in order to defend
the statute.' 9 In United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court sided with Roosevelt's
challenge that the provision was unconstitutional.2 °
12 See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President
in the Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REv. 239, 273-74 (1995).
13 Kelley, supra note 6, at 68.
'4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 3.
'" Under the constitutional theory of departmentalism, the argument is that the Constitution
empowers each branch to determine the meaning of the Constitution for itself, thus negating
the commonly held belief that the judiciary gets to settle questions of constitutional meaning.
For an extended discussion, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
6 See Urgency Deficit Appropriations Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304 57 Stat.
431, 450 (1943).
17 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1943).
18 Statement of the President Condemning Rider Prohibiting Federal Employment of Three
Named Individuals (Sept. 14, 1943), reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 386 (Samuel I. Rosemnan ed., 1943).
'9 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 306 (1946).
20 Id. at 315.
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The President can also refuse to execute provisions he determines are unconstitu-
tional. This is what President Bush has done nearly 1150 times since taking office in
2001.21 In 1994, Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger defended the President's
prerogative to resist enforcement of unconstitutional provisions of law this way:
The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional
provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the
Presidency. Where the President believes that an enactment un-
constitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to defend
his office and decline to abide by it, unless he is convinced that
the Court would disagree with his assessment. If the President
does not challenge such provisions (i.e., by refusing to execute
them), there often will be no occasion forjudicial consideration
of their constitutionality; a policy of consistent Presidential enforce-
ment of statutes limiting his power thus would deny the Supreme
Court the opportunity to review the limitations and thereby would
allow for unconstitutional restrictions on the President's authority.2
The third and fourth uses for the signing statement are the subject of this Article.
They involve using the legislative history of a bill to instruct certain actors on how
provisions of law should be interpreted. The legislative history of a bill contains a
diverse and voluminous set of information from floor statements, amendments, and
committee reports. Both are designed to help judges or bureaucrats interpret the legis-
lative intent of various provisions of law in the present or in the future. And it is on
the subject of legislative history that I will turn to next.
11. MEESE ELEVATES THE SIGNING STATEMENT
In a February 1986 speech that Attorney General Meese gave to the National
Press Club regarding gun control, Meese took the opportunity at the conclusion to
tell his audience of a recent decision by the administration to have the signing statement
included in the "Legislative History" section of the United States Code, Congressional
and Administrative News (USCCAN).23 Meese stated:
To make sure that the President's own understanding of what's
in a bill is the same.., or is given consideration at the time of
statutory construction later on by a court, we have now arranged
2' The number of challenges stems from my own database of presidential signing state-
ments, Monroe through Bush.
22 Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 199, 201 (1994).
23 Garber & Wimmer, supra note 10, at 367.
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with West Publishing Company that the presidential statement
on the signing of a bill will accompany the legislative history
from Congress so that all can be available to the court for future
construction of what that statute really means.24
The reactions to Meese's announcement did not come until November 1986,
when Reagan used the signing statement to accompany the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).25 Reagan's signing statement contained eight separate
challenges to provisions in the bill, and one challenge, regarding the interpretation
of an unclear term, caused enormous outrage both for his interpretation and the use
of the signing statement.26
The controversy stemmed from President Reagan's interpretation of a provision
authored by Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA), also known as the Frank Amend-
ment." Congressman Frank had been working on this particular provision for a number
of years prior to its passage in 1986. The provision was designed to build protections
into the immigration bill for lawful workers fired because of discrimination.28 The legal
standard Frank intended for a discriminatory firing was disparate treatment-which
placed the burden of proof upon the employer to prove the firing was for reasons other
than discrimination.29 When the bill went to conference, however, the language defin-
ing discrimination was stripped away, leaving the term intact. When Reagan signed the
bill, he filled the undefined provision with a meaning that was in clear contradiction
to that of Frank' S.30 Reagan wrote:
I understand section 274B to require a "discriminatory intent"
standard of proof: The party bringing the action must show that
in the decisionmaking process the defendant's action was moti-
vated by one of the prohibited criteria. Thus, it would be im-
proper to use the "disparate impact" theory of recovery, which
was developed under paragraph (2) of section 703(a) of title VII,
in a line of Supreme Court cases over the last 15 years.3 '
24 Id. (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Address at the National Press Club
(Feb. 25, 1986)).
2 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
26 Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 22 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 1534-37 (Nov. 6, 1986).
27 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2000).
28 Linda Greenhouse, In Signing Bills, Reagan Tries to Write History, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 1986, at B14.
29 H.R. 3080, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985).
30 Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 22 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 1534, 1535 (Nov. 6, 1986).
31 Id.
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Reagan's intent was clear. By changing the burden of proof from disparate
treatment to discriminatory intent, the proof was on the employee to prove that discrimi-
nation was at the heart of the termination, a position favored by an important polit-
ical constituency-business. Frank immediately objected, telling Linda Greenhouse
of The New York Times that this interpretation was "incorrect" and "intellectually
dishonest": "'To say you have to prove intent is to tell the bigots how to be smart
and evade the law .... 32
The larger question was also addressed by Greenhouse and others: did the
Reagan administration really believe that the signing statement's inclusion in the
legislative history would influence the decisionmaking process of federal j udges? 33
In an influential article on the signing statement and its inclusion in the USCCAN,
which appeared in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, two authors explored the
meaning of Reagan's action both in announcing the appendage to the legislative his-
tory and interpreting the Frank Amendment to IRCA. 4 In response to the announce-
ment to add the signing statement to the legislative history, the authors noted:
[T]hese "executive history" statements purport to ascertain the
intent of the Legislature in passing the bill. The danger inherent
in such a document is that its author will graft ambiguities and
exceptions onto an act that was not so encumbered during the
legislative process, thus making law in violation of Article I of
the Constitution. Moreover, such statements raise the specter of
an executive interpreting law, thereby encroaching on the exclusive
authority of the federal courts under Article Ei. 35
By employing a formalistic view of separation of powers,36 the authors argue that
the President's legislative powers are strictly limited to signing or vetoing a bill, and
his judicial powers involve the appointment of judges and little else.37 With the sign-
ing statement, the Reagan administration attempted to divine the intent of Congress
for judges wrestling with the meaning of the law. They wrote that "through the use of
presidential signing statements as a tool of statutory interpretation, the current admin-
istration is engaged in an overt attempt to usurp power reserved for the Legislature
and the Judiciary. ' '38
32 Greenhouse, supra note 28, at B14.
13 See, e.g., id.; Howard Kurtz, Ed Meese's Blind Spot, WASH. POST, July 19, 1987, at Cl.
' Garber & Wimmer, supra note 10.
31 Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
36 For a discussion of the formal versus the functional interpretation of separation of powers,
see Peter L. Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 489 (1987).
37 Garber & Wimmer, supra note 10, at 365 n.9.
38 Id. at 366.
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Most of the focus of the article was on the Reagan administration's attempt to
influence judicial decisionmaking, and it influenced the focus of later discussion of
the purpose of the signing statement and the action taken by the Meese Justice Depart-
ment.39 Absent from much of the scholarly literature is whether the Reagan adminis-
tration' s motivation may have been designed to influence bureaucratic administrators.
In the remaining portion of this Article, I argue that the primary motivation behind
the Westlaw decision was to influence executive branch administration of the law, and
only secondarily to influence judicial decisionmaking.
111. ExECuTIVE BRANCH IMPLICATIONS: EVIDENCE
With all of the attention that the Westlaw decision has received, it is surprising
that there has been little to no attention paid to why the decision was made. Most of
the discussion on the presidential signing statement tends to have a similar overview.
Nearly all claim that Jackson was the first to use the signing statement (wrong), and
all note that it was not until the Reagan administration and its decision to add the sign-
ing statement to USCCAN that the signing statement became a strategically important
presidential device.4" Oddly enough, given such an unusual move, none have taken
the time to examine the deliberative process inside the Justice Department that led
to the unusual decision.
The Reagan administration recognized the value of the signing statement when
it took office in 1981. It was Reagan who understood that, when combined with other
devices, it could enhance presidential power. The question: Why did they wait until
1986 to add it to the legislative history?
The answer to that question is multifaceted. It involves three parts: (1) a combi-
nation of an administrative strategy to governing; (2) an increasingly hostile external
political environment; and (3) Supreme Court cases that cited the signing statement
in the majority opinion. I will address each of these points separately below.
A. The Administrative Presidency
It is the Nixon administration that gets credited with developing a strategy to
centralize administrative control inside the White House and away from the bureau-
cratic agencies and departments.4' When Nixon came to office in 1969, he faced
an entrenched bureaucracy of "New Deal" Democrats who could resist any of his
39 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 10; Killenbeck, supra note 12.
40 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 10, at 476,490; Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What
You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REv. 755, 763,
786-87 (1987).
41 See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PRESIDENCY 7-8 (1975).
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policies.42 As a means to avoid that barrier, he implemented a number of changes that
began to move the administration of policy closer to the President.43 The strategy,
however, was short-circuited by Watergate. 4
Prior to Reagan taking office in 198 1, the conservative think-tank the Heritage
Foundation put together a blueprint for presidential success titled Mandate for
Leadership.45 Mandate allowed the Reagan administration to "hit the ground running"
by aggressively moving forward with a number of carefully planned governing strate-
gies before political enemies and bureaucratic resistance had a chance to set in.46
Part of this control meant putting political loyalists into key positions. For the
particularly important political positions, candidates had to pass an ideological litmus
test in which they were asked if they were not just Republican but also conservative
Republican. 47 Reagan was able to take advantage of changes to civil service laws dur-
ing the Carter administration that expanded the number of political appointees to
strategic positions within the bureaucracy. 4' Reagan's Attorney General for the second
term, Edwin Meese, remarked of this process:
[W]e sought to ensure that all political appointees in the agencies
were vetted through the White House personnel process, and to
have a series of orientation seminars for all high-ranking officials
on the various aspects of the Reagan program. We wanted our
appointees to be the President's ambassadors to the agencies, not
the other way around.49
A second important component to the administrative strategy involved the use
of two key executive orders that would put a political filter at the beginning and end
of the rulemaking process.
The first executive order, 12,291, required all the agencies and departments to
assess the costs of new regulations to business versus the benefits to society."0 If
42 Id. at 72-73.
43 Id.
44id.
41 HERITAGE FOUNDATION, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A
CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION (Charles L. Heatherly ed., 1981).
46 JAMES P. PFIFFNER, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENCY: HITING THE GROUND RUNNING
13-14 (2d. ed., rev. 1996).
47 ROBERT MARANTO, POLICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE MODERN PRESIDENCY:
CAREERISTS AND APPOINTEES IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 48-49 (1993).
48 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codi-
fied at 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)). The change allowed Reagan to appoint 5000 individuals to
important agencies or departments in the administration. See PFIFFNER, supra note 46, at 56-57.
49 EDWIN MEESE II, WITH REAGAN: THE INSIDE STORY 77 (1992).
'0 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
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the agency or department could not defend the costs, the regulation would not move
forward." Even more importantly, the order empowered the Office of Management
and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as the
centralizing agency to filter new regulations through.52 The second important execu-
tive order, 12,498, enhanced the value of 12,291.53 It was designed to influence the
agency rulemaking process prior to any action taken on any rule.54 It required all
regulators to submit to OMB their proposed regulatory agenda for the coming year.55
Taken together, the orders provided the Reagan administration with a "good deal of
informal monitoring and communication."56 As to their effectiveness? One staff
person at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stated that "[y]ou don't spend
two years thinking about a regulation without thinking about whether OMB is going
to shoot it down. 57
These two executive orders, coupled with the strategic appointments, went a long
way towards making the bureaucracy sensitive to the administration's political needs.
Making bureaucratic administrators aware of the President's position on policy would
be a key objective of the strategy to add the signing statement to the legislative history.
One final component of this strategy would involve the ability to remove bureaucratic
interpretation of legislation wherever possible, submitting the interpretation of political
appointees instead. This final piece would fall into place in 1984 in the Supreme
Court case Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,58 which involved
interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.' 9
At issue in the case was statutory interpretation by administrators and questions
arising from that interpretation.' ° When judges face cases challenging the interpre-
tation of bureaucrats, they should follow a two-step process.6' In the first step, the
judge should determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue.62 If the intent of
Congress is clear, then the issue of interpretation ends.63 If the meaning is not clear,
then the judge should defer to a reasonable interpretation by the administrator. 64 As
far as the Reagan administration was concerned, when a bureaucrat is faced with
' Id. at § 2(b).
52 Id. at § 6.
5 Exec Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (Jan. 4, 1985).
54 id.
" Id. at § 1.
56 Joseph Cooper & William West, Presidential Power and Republican Government: The
Theory and Practice of OMB Review ofAgency Rules, 50 J. POL. 876 (1988).
7 ld. at 876.
58 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
'9 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000)).
60 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
61 Id. at 842.
62 id.
63 id.
id. at 843.
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
making a judgment call on an unclear provision of a law, he or she should make that
call with the President's preferences in mind.65
The first part of this section examined the strategy of working through, or
working over, the executive branch departments and agencies. This administrative
strategy involved politicizing as much of the bureaucracy as possible; it involved the
use of executive orders to pull the executive branch departments and agencies towards
the President's preferences as much as possible; and it involved an important Supreme
Court decision respecting the "expertise" of administrators when interpreting ambiguous
or undefined provisions of law, thus creating the potential for the administration to get
into the heads of administrators.
The second part will focus on the hostile political environment that the Reagan
administration faced from the time it took office until the time it left. The hostile
political environment made it difficult for the President to work with Congress, thus
frustrating his responsibility to lead. When the legislative option closed, the President
was forced to find another way to make good on the promises he made in the course
of the 1980 and 1984 presidential campaigns. This other way would involve the
development of tools, such as the signing statement, that enable the President to
succeed unilaterally.
B. Increased Polarization
When Reagan was elected to the presidency in 1980, the effects of Watergate had
ruined two previous presidencies.' His election victory, close in the popular vote,
was a wipe-out where it mattered-the Electoral College. Reagan declared a mandate
after winning forty-four states, as well as taking control of the Senate, and securing
a more conservative House with the help of "Reagan" Democrats-Southern Democrats
who supported Reagan and his policies.67
Reagan's greatest success came in 1981 when his agenda received eighty-two
percent of roll call votes in Congress.68 Much of his success came from the thought
his aides put into that first year in office. The aides, learning from the mistakes that
Carter had made in his first year, kept the legislative agenda short and simple.69 Carter
came to office with a cluttered first agenda, thus confusing supporters in Congress as
to what was immediately important and what was important in the "long term." For
Reagan, it was all about speed and focus.7" It meant sending a sparse legislative agenda
65 Cf id. at 843-44.
6 Kelley, supra note 6, at 79-81.
67 SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINs AND
DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1993, at 362 (2d. ed., 1994).
68 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 23-B (1988).
' PFIFFNER, supra note 46, at 125.
70 Id.
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with a couple of big items to Congress and lobbying aggressively before coalitions
could form to oppose it.7 The focus was onjust one theme-"shrinking the welfare
state. ' 7 2 This theme involved tax cuts as well as cuts to domestic spending, culminating
in "more than $35 billion in domestic program reductions, a multiyear package of nearly
$750 billion in tax cuts, and a three-year, 27 percent increase in defense spending"73
which looked to make good on Reagan's promise of "peace through strength. 74
As the misty-eyed romantics of the Reagan presidency would have you believe, the
first year legislative successes were typical for the two terms of Reagan's presidency.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite his first year successes, Reagan was
never able to replicate them in the seven years that followed.75 In every year following
1981, Reagan consistently lost legislative support for his policies, bottoming out in 1987
when he was only able to win on 43.5% of the 192 roll call votes taken on positions
that Reagan supported.76 As Roger Davidson observed: "Reagan got his licks in early
in 1981. By 1982, he had a hard time selling them cheap lemonade. 77
What was the cause of the decline in legislative support on Capitol Hill? It seems
that most came as a result of the electoral losses suffered by congressional Republicans
in every election after 1980.78 By 1986, the Republicans had lost the Senate, and the
entire Congress had lurched dramatically to the left.79 The 1982 midterm election-
the first test of the President's coattails-resulted in the worst midterm loss, at the
time, for a President's party since 1922.80 The gains the Democrats made in 1982
emboldened them enough to challenge the administration's claim of a "mandate."81
The Democrats proceeded to challenge all parts of the Reagan Revolution-the tax
cuts, the increase in defense spending, and the deep cuts in domestic spending.82 In
1984, despite Reagan's trouncing of his Democratic challenger, Walter Mondale, the
Republicans running for Congress did worse than anticipated, picking up only four-
teen House seats and losing two Senate seats. 3 And as noted above, in the 1986 mid-
term election, Republicans suffered in both chambers, which led to a flip in control
71 Id.
72 MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 67, at 365.
71 Id. at 365-66.
71 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 23-B (1988).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 22-B.
"' Id. at 23-B.
78 Patrick A. Hurley, Partisan Representation, Realignment, and the Senate in the 1980s,
53 J. POL. 3, 3 (1991).
79 Id.
" Alan I. Abramowitz, Economic Conditions, Presidential Popularity, and Voting Behavior
in Midterm Congressional Elections, 47 J. POL. 31, 41 (1985).
8 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
82 Michael Nelson, Elections and Achievement: Campaigning and Governing in the
Reagan Era, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 5, 15 (Paul Kengor & Peter Schweizer eds., 2005).
83 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 3-B, 7-B, 13-B (1984).
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of the Senate from the Republicans to the Democrats, giving the Democrats complete
control of Congress.'
The losses in Congress were not just because of a loss in support among Republican
members, but also represented a loss in conservative Democrats who had made many
of Reagan's 1981 successes possible.85 For instance, in 1981 Reagan was able to
court Republicans and conservative Democrats in order to pass a highly contentious
sale of aircraft with advanced radar equipment to Saudi Arabia.86 In 1987, the year
in which Reagan scored the lowest on roll call votes, he vetoed the first two big bills of
the year--one that dealt with water treatment and the other with highway construction.87
Despite making personal appearances on Capitol Hill to placate wavering Republicans
on veto override votes, Reagan was unable to get anyone to switch, causing both vetoes
to be overridden.88 Thus, though Reagan could count on a coalition of conservative
Democrats and moderate Republicans in the House, as well as Republican control of
the Senate, to pass his agenda in the early years, by the end of his first term and certainly
in the second term, working with Congress became exceedingly difficult. Thus, to
advance the Reagan agenda, it would take more of a strategy than just working with
Congress to get it done.
But it was not just the loss of support in Congress that forced the Reagan adminis-
tration onto a unilateral path. A second major problem involved an increasingly partisan
Congress that was much more in tune with the type of Congresses that Presidents Ford
and Carter faced as a result of Watergate. Not only was Reagan unable to work with
Congress on his legislative agenda, but he was also spending more and more time
fending off attempts by Congress to box him-and his exercise of prerogatives-in.
What follows next is a discussion of Reagan's failure to defend claims of executive
privilege when Congress subpoenaed documents, a loss in constitutional brinksmanship
with Congress over the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, and a bitter confir-
mation battle with the Senate over Reagan's choice of Meese as his Attorney General
in the second term.
1. Executive Privilege Fails
At the end of 1981 and into 1982, an oversight subcommittee in the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce subpoenaed documents from the Department
of Interior relating to a discriminatory policy by the Canadian government directed
towards U.S. oil companies.89 The subcommittee wanted to investigate whether there
See Hurley, supra note 78, at 3.
85 See generally id. (tracking partisan voting patterns in the 1980s).
86 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 129-40 (1981).
87 43 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 6 (1987).
88 Id. at 4-C.
89 Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative
of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REv. 631, 654-55 (1997).
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was sufficient evidence to warrant retaliation by the United States. The subcommittee
called Interior Secretary James Watt to testify, only the Reagan administration had
directed Watt to assert executive privilege in order to "protect sensitive cabinet level
deliberations and avoid premature disclosure of foreign policy deliberations which
could compromise ongoing diplomatic relations with Canada."' After numerous and
lengthy negotiations between the House subcommittee and the Reagan administration
to release the information without infringing upon presidential prerogatives, it appeared
that both were at an impasse.9 After concluding that the Reagan administration would
not budge, the House subcommittee, followed by the full Committee, voted to hold
Watt in contempt of Congress.92 When it appeared likely that the full House would
vote in favor of contempt, the Reagan administration capitulated and agreed to allow
the subcommittee (with no staff present) to review and take notes of the documents
for a four-hour period.93
Similarly, 1982 also brought a second high profile fight between the House and
the White House over the assertion of executive privilege to protect (or conceal) infor-
mation. This particular battle, which involved the EPA and information pertaining to
dumping of hazardous waste is what Mark Rozell referred to as the "most contentious
executive privilege debate in the Reagan administration." 94 In this particular case,
the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee requested information from the EPA that
the Reagan administration had either delayed or refused to release.95 Caught in the
middle was EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford. When she was ordered to
appear before the two subcommittees, the Reagan administration ordered her to invoke
executive privilege under the argument that "disclosure of 'enforcement-sensitive'
documents would compromise the government's strategies and advantage defendants. 96
After she invoked the privilege, the Public Works Subcommittee cited her with con-
tempt, which was affirmed by the full House, making Gorsuch-Burford the highest
ranking public official to be cited for contempt by the full House.97
The administration was forced to negotiate a deal with the House to swap infor-
mation in return for dropping the contempt charge, similar to the case above involving
Interior Secretary Watt. Both cases left the Reagan administration's claims of privilege
damaged given that twice it had to capitulate to the House during a period in which
90 Id. at 655.
9' Id. at 656.
92 Id.
93 id.
94 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modem Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow,
83 MN. L. REV. 1069, 1096 (1999).
9' Miller, supra note 89, at 657.
96 Id. at 657-58.
97 Id. at 658.
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Republicans controlled the Senate and the presidency. And the Gorsuch-Burford
controversy added one more blow to presidential power. The investigations into
dumping of hazardous waste, and the move by the administration to assert executive
privilege in order to cover it up, led to the call for and naming of an independent coun-
sel to investigate the actions of then-Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) head Theodore
Olson.98 A report by the House Judiciary Committee claimed that Olson had given
false or misleading information during the course of the investigations and suggested
that the Attorney General name an independent counsel to pursue the question of
whether Olson lied.99 Olson, whose office was designed to protect the constitutional
prerogatives of the presidency, argued that the independent counsel fell under the con-
trol of the Attorney General.'0 The independent counsel, Alexia Morrison, argued that
the position was created to be free from executive control, as a result of the "Saturday
Night Massacre" during the Nixon administration.'°' The Reagan administration
gambled on its position and sued for clarification, which the Supreme Court provided
in 1988. The Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Olson (with Chief Justice Rehnquist
writing for the majority) decided in favor of Morrison, °2 thus diminishing the
President's claim of control over inferior executive officers.
2. Competition in Contract Controversy
In 1984, Reagan signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.03 In his signing
statement, Reagan objected to the grant of executive authority "to stay a procure-
ment to a legislative officer, the Comptroller General.""' Reagan continued, noting
the stay "unconstitutionally attempt[s] to delegate to the Comptroller General of the
United States, an officer of Congress, the power to perform duties and responsibilities
that in our constitutional system may be performed only by officials of the executive
branch."'0 5 Giving executive functions to a legislative officer violated separation
of powers, the administration reasoned.
98 Id. at 659-60.
99 Id. at 660.
10o Howard Kurtz, Meese Tries to Block Expansion of 'Superfund' Investigation, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1987, at A3.
101 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justices Are Urged to Nullify Independent Prosecutor Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1988, at Al.
102 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
103 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,98 Stat. 494 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2000)).
'0o Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The LegalAdhesivefora Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZOL. REV. 337,339 (1993) (discussing Competition in Contracting Act,
which was partly enacted through the Deficit Reduction Act).
'0' Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1037 (July 18, 1984).
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On October 17, 1984, the OLC issued an opinion supporting Reagan's position that
the Comptroller General provision was unconstitutional,° 6 and the Attorney General
also notified Congress that the Justice Department would not defend the provision if
challenged in court, nor would the administration enforce it. 10 7 A couple of months
later, David Stockton, the Director of the OMB, sent out a notice to all executive branch
agencies, just days after the regulations were finalized, instructing agency heads that
they were not to act on the invalid provision."°8 When Congress summoned executive
officials to explain the administration's position, the officials argued that until the
courts ruled on the provisions they were going to proceed as if the provisions were
unenforceable." The courts, however, would speak.
Just months after the bill was signed into law, the Navy opened up bids to contract
for parts on particular aircraft.' ° One of the bidders, Lear Siegler, Inc., protested the
awarding of the contract to an Israeli military contractor."' Under the law, Lear
Siegler filed the protest with the Comptroller General, who should have then stayed
the contract until a hearing could determine who deserved it. Since the administration
believed that the process was unconstitutional, it continued with the award to the
foreign contractor." 2 Lear Siegler filed suit against the Navy, which the Senate, the
Comptroller General, and the House of Representatives joined."3
The administration's assertion of the right to refuse enforcement of a provision
of law it independently determined was constitutionally defective failed to persuade
the district court." 4 The administration appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and continued to refuse enforcement until a ruling by the circuit."5 The
House Government Operations Committee called the new Attorney General, Meese,
to testify and explain why the administration would not enforce the decision in light
of the district court's ruling. Meese informed the Committee that the administration
would not respect the district court's ruling because the court was "not competent"
to rule on the law." 6 In response, the Committee voted to withhold funding for the
"6 Implementation of the Bid Protest Provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act,
8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 236 (1984).
107 Kmiec, supra note 104, at 349.
108 Robert Rothman, GAO's Authority over Agencies Questioned: Administration, Hill
Snarled in Constitutional Confrontation, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 9, 1985, at 464;
Myron Struck, GAO Sets Disputed Contract Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1984, at A2.
" Rothman, supra note 108, at 464.
0 Christine E. Burgess, Note, When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 631, 643 (1994).
111 Id. at 643.
112 Id.
113 See Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1102-06 (9th Cir. 1987) rev'din part, 893
F.2d 205 (9th Cir.1989).
114 Id. at 1105-06.
"1 Id. at 1104.
16 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 239 (1985).
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Justice Department and the OMB for the following two fiscal years unless the admin-
istration relented.117 Attorney General Meese circulated a memo to all executive branch
agencies ordering them to comply with the district court's rulings until the outcome
of the appeal.
1 8
The administration was faced with a Congress that was eager to push back and
more than willing to frustrate its political agenda. Not under discussion here, but
certainly a part of the contentious relationship with Congress, was the controversial
episode of Iran-Contra, which nearly led to impeachment proceedings against the
President. "9 Iran-Contra involved arms sales to Iranians, with the proceeds of those
sales funneled to the contra rebels in Nicaragua. 20 This was done to skirt federal law
that prohibited the administration from using public or private funds for the purpose of
intervention in the Nicaragua Civil War.' That episode led to an independent coun-
sel investigation at a cost of millions of dollars from the treasury, the indictment and
pardon of administration officials, and a loss of public confidence in the Reagan
administration.'22 This episode has been covered more extensively elsewhere'23 and
space prohibits rehashing the particulars here other than to note that it played a role
in the bitter relationship between the Reagan administration and Congress. The third
part deals with Meese's confirmation fight to become Attorney General.
C. Meese's Confirmation Hearings
Attorney General Meese was nominated to succeed William French Smith in
January 1984.124 Meese had been one of the three men who served initially as the
troika chief of staff system early in Reagan's first term. 12 He was serving as
Counselor to the President when he was nominated to become the Attorney General
of the United States. 126 Meese was a controversial figure-a conservative force
inside the administration.
117 See Paulsen, supra note 15, at 328.
118 Id.
"9 See generally Ryan J. Barilleaux & Christopher Kelley, Ronald Reagan, Iran-Contra,
and Presidential Power, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: ASSESSING THE MAN AND HIS LEGACY
115-16 (Paul Kengor & Peter Schweizer eds., 2005).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 125-26.
123 See id. at 115-29.
124 Nadine Cohodas, Party-Line Decision Likely: Panel Set to Vote on Meese After Querying
Ethical Fitness, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Feb. 2, 1985, at 200.
125 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, RONALD REAGAN: FATE, FREEDOM, AND THE MAKING OF
HISTORY 170 (2007).
126 Id. at 166-67.
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During his confirmation hearings, there were allegations that Meese had accepted
financial assistance in return for helping individuals obtain federal jobs.127 Senator
Joseph Biden (D-DE) asked for an independent counsel to investigate the charges,
which occurred and lasted for five months. 128 The independent counsel found that
some of the allegations "were indictable" but would not be pursued.'29 In addition to
the independent counsel investigation, there were also a total of eleven other charges,
which ranged from Meese' s alleged involvement in stealing President Carter's cam-
paign documents for use in a 1980 debate with Ronald Reagan to money he received
in trade for some particular service. 3 ° Meese also faced an investigation by the Office
of Government Ethics, which provided a background check into the "fitness of presi-
dential nominees."'' A version of the Office of Government Ethics report on Meese
was leaked to The Wall Street Journal, which suggested that Meese was facing two
violations of standard conduct.'32 When the leaked report went public, the head of the
investigation, who had communicated with White House Counselor Fred Fielding,
reversed the findings of the report, which led to a claim of political coercion.' 33
Because of the multiple investigations, the ninety-eighth session of Congress
ran out of time before the Senate Judiciary Committee could finish its business with
Meese's nomination.'34 Meese had to suffer the indignity of having his nomination
resubmitted to the ninety-ninth session of Congress. Finally, on February 23, 1985,
Meese became the Attorney General-a process that took, from inception in the pre-
ceding Congress, a total of thirteen months. 35 Even after his confirmation, he faced
investigations by the Senate into his dealings with a military contractor. 116 There was
also an investigation relating to his involvement with an Iraqi oil pipeline.' 37 Both
actions led to a second independent counsel investigation.
IV. THE 1986 WESTLAW DECISION
This brings us to the strategy meetings that resulted in the unusual decision to add
the signing statement to the legislative history of some bills the President signs into
law. The previous sections argued that the decision was not made in a vacuum but
127 Cohodas, supra note 124, at 200.
128 NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICs IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 101 (1992).
129 id.
130 Cohodas, supra note 124, at 201.
1"1 ld. at 203.
132 id.
133 Id.
'34 Id. at 200.
13' Nadine Cohodas, Waited 13 Months: Meese Is Confirmed by Senate in an Unusual
Saturday Session, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 2, 1985, at 385.
136 BAKER, supra note 128, at 101.
137 Id. at 101-02.
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was more a response to an increasingly hostile political environment that the adminis-
tration faced. Its legislative agenda was shut down by a loss in support of Republicans
in each election from 1982 forward. Furthermore, the administration, when going toe-
to-toe with the House of Representatives, was forced to back away from two claims
of executive privilege and in one high profile claim to refuse to enforce a law that it
determined was unconstitutional. And then finally, there was the bitter, thirteen-
month confirmation battle, complete with the independent counsel investigations. The
process left the administration in general, and the Justice Department in particular,
with the belief that in order to protect its prerogatives and its agenda, it would take a
bold strategy that involved unilateral action. The decision to add the signing statement
to the legislative history was only natural in light of the raised profile of the signing
statement prior to the 1986 decision.
There were two instances in which the Supreme Court recognized the presidential
signing statement in the course of making its decision. The first decision was INS v.
Chadha, the case that dealt with the legislative veto. 138 The legislative veto is a device
that Congress uses to track the way in which the administrative agencies carry out the
law. Normally it requires the agencies to notify a committee of Congress before pro-
ceeding with their legal obligations. The veto comes when a committee (or committees)
refuses to allow the agency to proceed. Presidents have long objected to the legislative
veto because, on practical grounds, it is overly burdensome and, on constitutional
grounds, because it violates the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. 139 Because
the legislative veto does not proceed through the legislative process the way other bills
do, and because it is not "presented" to the President for his approval or disapproval,
it is unconstitutional.
In the Carter administration, the Justice Department began to refuse enforcement
or defense of the legislative veto on constitutional grounds. 4 ° Late in its first term,
the administration decided to side with a challenge to the legislative veto that involved
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The case reached the Supreme Court dur-
ing the Reagan administration. Despite Reagan's assurances on the 1980 campaign
trail that he would not advance the case to the Supreme Court after he took office,
his Justice Department did just that, much to the dismay of members of Congress.' 4'
The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.'42 In the
majority opinion, Justice Burger pointed to the historical practice of past presidents-
dating to the Wilson administration-objecting to the legislative veto in their signing
138 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
"9 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2; infra note 143 and accompanying text.
14 Kelley, supra note 6, at 78.
141 Christopher S. Kelley, The Significance of the Presidential Signing Statement, in
EXECUTING THE CONsTITuTION: PUTTING THE PREsIDENT BACK IN THE CONsTrTUTION
(Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006).
"4 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928.
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statements.'43 For the Reagan administration, this was an early signal thatjudges paid
attention to the signing statement.
A second Supreme Court case made the signing statement more central to the
decision. When Reagan signed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985,1' more popularly known as Gramm-Rudman, he singled out two de-
fective provisions in a signing statement. 45 The first defective provision involved
giving the Comptroller General executive powers."4 The second defective provision
involved the use of a legislative veto, which had been declared unconstitutional in
the Chadha decision.1
47
In the 1986 Supreme Court decision Bowsher v. Synar, which challenged Gramm-
Rudman, the Supreme Court relied upon the reasoning of Reagan's signing statement
in its majority opinion, deciding that the executive powers bestowed upon an agent of
Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine.
148
In a separate examination on the use of the signing statement, I conducted elite
interviews with a number of individuals in the Meese Justice Department who served
at the time of the decision to add the signing statement to USCCAN. 149 The interviews
were designed to get a sense of why such an unusual decision was made. Meese re-
ported that once he was confirmed as Attorney General, he moved fast to "convene
early morning 'brainstorming' sessions... [in which] all the division heads would
gather to discuss" ways to make the signing statement a meaningful presidential
device.150 Another individual in the OLC, Douglas Kmiec, recalled that a great deal
of emphasis at the meetings was placed on making the signing statement "a crucial
vehicle for the President to give his subordinate officers direction .... 'rather than
relying solely upon the far less transparent judgment of someone in an executive
agency applying the law for the first time."""'
Since that time, the confirmation hearings for Justice Samuel Alito in January
2006 revealed a great deal about the internal process that placed the signing statement
into the legislative history. In December 2005, the Bush administration agreed to release
to the public numerous documents relating to Alito's days in the Justice Department. 15 2
143 Id. at942 n.13.
'4 Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)).
141 Statement on Signing H.J. Res. 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1490,
1490-91 (Dec. 12, 1985).
'46 Id. at 1491.
147 Id.
148 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986).
"'4 See Kelley, supra note 6, at 5.
1'0 Id. at 100.
'5' Id. at 100-01.
is2 See, e.g., Jesse J. Holland, A Court in Transition, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 21, 2005,
at A7.
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Among the many documents released, a number focused on why the decision to add
the signing statement to the legislative history was made. 1
53
The process actually began early in 1985 when D. Lowell Jensen, a Justice
Department official, wrote to Fred Fielding, who was Counselor to President Reagan,
complaining about a signing statement that had been removed when it reached the
President's desk. 154 When the White House received the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act
of 1985,'5 the OLC added a signing statement that contained two challenges to pro-
visions of the bill that it believed violated the separation of powers. 56 At some point,
the provisions were stripped away by other officials in the executive branch without
telling anyone in the OLC.157 In a telling passage, Jensen informed Fielding that the
"signing statements perform important functions by placing an interpretation on a statute
and by giving instructions to the agency charged with the administration of a statute,"
and he suggested some procedures in elevating the profile of the signing statement. 158
In August 1985, Steven Calabresi and John Harrison, who both worked in the
OLC, prepared a memo for the new Attorney General on the subject of the presi-
dential signing statement.'59 In the memo, the two argued that the time was right to
consider "a potentially powerful, if so far unused, tool: Presidential signing state-
ments." 16° They outlined four possible ways to make the signing statement more
widely used and known: the first was to write to the West Publishing Company to see
if the signing statement could be included in the legislative history of bills the same
way that committee reports are included, and if not, then to have the Government
Printing Office (GPO) publish them; the second involved giving a series of speeches
to assembled judges in order to elevate the signing statement's profile; the third was
to make sure that attorneys in the Justice Department cited signing statements in their
briefs and opinions; and the fourth was to have the OLC draft a law review article
defending the signing statement.161 The Attorney General responded that he wanted
to move forward on the signing statement and charged the Office of Legal Policy in-
side the Justice Department with identifying issues surrounding the placement of the
13 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Alito Backed Immunity in Wiretap Case, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 24, 2005, at Al.
" Letter from D. Lowell Jensen, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen. to Fred Fielding, Counselor
to the President (Apr. 2, 1985), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/
accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
"I Pub. L. No. 99-5,90 Stat. 7 (1985) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 776, 3631-3644 (2000)).
156 See Jensen, supra note 154.
157 Id. at 1.
158 Id.
'51 Memorandum from Steven Calabresi & John Harrison, OLC Officers, to the Att'y Gen.
(Aug. 2, 1985), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-
269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
'60 Id. at 1.
161 Id. at 2.
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signing statement in the legislative history and ways in which the Justice Department
could encourage more widespread use throughout the executive branch.'62
On September 3, 1985, T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to the Attorney General,
wrote in a memo to James Spears, the Acting Assistant to the Attorney General, that
the signing statement was under-utilized as a resource to advance presidential pref-
erences and to protect presidential prerogatives.161 In response, Ralph Tarr, Acting
Assistant Attorney General in the OLC outlined the current process (as it stood in
1985) for adding a signing statement to a bill, noting that it was ad hoc and often not
thought through, given that there was only a ten-day window in which to work (because
the Constitution gives the President ten days to act on a bill).1" What is especially
important are the ways in which Tarr suggested the signing statement may be used.
First, he argued that the signing statement, or the threat of a signing statement, could
be used to gain added leverage against Congress. 165 The idea was that if the signing
statement became the important power envisioned, then Congress, hoping to short-
circuit any action taken on legislation after it left Congress, would be willing to com-
promise with the administration. While the process envisioned by Tar may not have
taken place, Bryan Marshall and I have shown that the signing statement, when used
in conjunction with the veto threat, has been especially useful in gaining extra advan-
tages from legislation presented to the President for his signature. 166
In addition, Tarr argued for three immediate uses of the signing statement, which
shed light on the primary argument of this Article-that is, the reason to add the
signing statement to the legislative history was done for internal, rather than external,
reasons. The first use identified by Tar was to influence how agencies interpret a
statute. 67 He argued that the deference given to agency interpretation of defective or
undefined provisions of a law should mean that the interpretation is influenced by the
President's understanding provided by the signing statement. 68 The second use was
to inform Congress of a problematic or defective provision in a bill and how Congress
162 Memorandum from T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to Charles Fried,
Acting Solicitor Gen. (Sept. 3, 1985), at 1, available at http://www.archives.gov/news/
samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
163 Memorandum from T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to James M. Spears,
Acting Ass't to the Att'y Gen., (Sept. 3, 1985), at 1, available at http://www.archives.gov/
news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
" Memorandum from Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., to T. Kenneth Cribb,
Counselor to the Att'y Gen. (Oct. 2, 1985), at 1, available at http://www.archives.gov/news/
samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
165 Id. at 2.
'6 Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan Marshall, Assessing Presidential Power: Veto Politics
and Presidential Signing Statements as Coordinated Strategies (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author), available at http:www.allacademic.com/meta/pI51834_index.html.
167 Tarr, supra note 164, at 3.
168 Id. at 5-6.
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might correct it in the future. 169 And the third use was to influence judges, though
Tarr noted that the courts only occasionally cite them. 70
In December 1985, Meese wrote to the West Publishing Company asking for
permission to add the signing statement to the legislative history,'7 ' and in response,
the president of the company agreed, adding, "I am surprised nobody thought of
it before."' 17
2
On February 5, 1986, Samuel Alito, then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the OLC prepared a memo designed to make the signing statement more indispensable
to the President upon enactment of a law. 173 Within the OLC, a "Litigation Strategy
Group" (this is where the "brainstorming sessions" discussed above took place) was
formed to discuss the positive and negative aspects of the presidential signing state-
ment.'74 Among the objectives Alito noted, the signing statement may be a way to
counterbalance the influence of Congress when judges interpret legislative history,
but more importantly, it can be used to "increase the power of the executive to shape
the law."'' 75 Alito recommended beginning to use the signing statement on a few bills
that were below the radar of Congress and those in which the presidential challenge
or interpretation was on solid ground.176 Once those bills were identified, and the
President brought on board, the staff inside the Justice Department should follow
up with articles defending the signing statement in several high profile law journals. 177
Shortly thereafter, Meese went public with the Westlaw decision in his National Press
Club speech discussed above.
178
CONCLUSION
It was my intent at the outset to do two things: first, to provide details to a
decision that heretofore has gone unexplained. That is, the extraordinary decision
169 Id. at 3-4.
170 Id. at 4.
17' Letter from Edwin Meese, III, Att'y Gen., to Dwight D. Opperman, Chief Executive
Officer, West Publ'g Co. (Dec. 13, 1985), at 1, available at http://www.archives.gov/news/
samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
172 Letter from Dwight D. Opperman, Chief Executive Officer, West Publ'g Co., to Edwin
Meese, III, Att'y Gen. (Dec. 26, 1985), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-
alito/accession-060-89-269/accO6O-89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf.
'7' Letter from Samuel Alito, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., to Litigation Strategy Group (Feb. 5,
1986), available athttp://www.archives.gov/newslsamuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-
89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb 1986.pdf.
'74 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
17' Alito, supra note 173, at 2.
176 Id. at 4.
... Id. at 4-6.
178 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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by the Reagan administration to announce that it would begin adding the signing
statement to the legislative history that appeared in the USCCAN published by the
West Publishing Company. This was an important development in the evolution of
the signing statement, yet why it was made has largely been taken for granted. Second,
I wanted to correct the record on the impetus behind the decision. It has been argued
that the primary motivation was to influence the decisions of judges, who look to the
legislative history to clarify ambiguous or undefined provisions of law. My argument
suggests that the primary motivation was internal, and not external, to the executive
branch. The purpose was to influence bureaucratic decisionmaking when it came to
interpreting vague or undefined provisions of law, and/or when it came to provisions
deemed unconstitutional by the President.
On what basis did I make this claim? I argued that a combination of events pushed
the administration in this direction. For instance, an increasingly hostile Congress
throughout the 1980s made it difficult for the administration to advance its policy
preferences by working in partnership with the legislative branch. In order to suc-
ceed, the Reagan administration moved its preferences unilaterally. In addition, the
administration needed to protect presidential prerogatives from a hostile Congress-
prerogatives such as executive privilege or the obligation to direct inferior executive
branch officers. Thus, the signing statement was the best vehicle to communicate the
view that a provision was unconstitutional to the appropriate agency, commission,
or department.
I also used the words of those involved in the decision to support my argument.
Interviews I conducted for my earlier research and the memos released in 2005 by the
current Bush administration showed a continuous need to use the signing statement
as a way of controlling the administration of law. More recently, Steven Calabresi,
who worked in the OLC when the Westlaw decision was made (and claims to be the
person behind advancing it), has argued that the purpose of the signing statement is
to coordinate the bureaucratic agents with the preferences of the President.'79
My argument under study here is also a practical one. The President has a great
deal of influence over the bureaucracy because he is the head of it--the Chief Executive
Officer. He does not have that kind of influence over judges because the judiciary is
a separate constitutional institution. So for purposes of influencing judicial decision-
making, the Reagan administration was simply covering its bases. Ifjudges used leg-
islative history, then the President's position should at least be given as much weight
as Congress. if judges deferred to the interpretation of an inferior officer, then the
officer should understand the President's particular viewpoint. Furthermore, when
the OLC was meeting to discuss this decision, there was evidence at that time that
' Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing
Statements, FORUM, 2006, http://www.bepress.com/forumvol4/iss2/art8/.
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judges were highly inclined to use legislative history. 80 By the end of the 1980s that
was no longer true. 8'
I am also making this argument in the hope that future studies of the signing
statement will pay more attention to precisely how, and under what conditions, execu-
tive agents are influenced by the President's position. There needs to be more work
such as Michael Herz's study of the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990.182 In that
article, Herz found that President George H.W. Bush's signing statement, reinforced
with visits to the EPA by individuals in the OIRA, was highly successful in getting a
final rule from the EPA that was friendly to the business community.'83 And in 2002,
President George W. Bush used his signing statement to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
184
to attempt to narrow protections given to whistleblowers (once again an interpretation
that favored the business community)'--language that showed up in a legal brief
written by the Acting Solicitor General in the Department of Labor. 8 6 It was clear that
Bush's interpretation was done in support of an important political constituency, and
only after immense pressure from senators and outside interest groups did the admin-
istration withdraw the interpretation. 187 It is clear that using the signing statement to
pressure bureaucratic agents is immensely useful to any administration because it
is difficult for anyone to monitor. We should all work to change that equation.
180 See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294,294-306 (1982) (conclud-
ing that in the ten-year period ending in 1979, the Supreme Court was three times as likely
to use legislative history in nearly every case involving U.S. law); see also Patricia M. Wald,
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
IowA L. REv. 195, 195-216 (1983) (showing that by 1981, the Supreme Court was relying
upon legislative history in greater frequency than at any period in the past).
181 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 845, 846 (1992) ("[B]y 1989, the Court decided a significant number of statutory
cases ... without any reference to legislative history .... ").
182 Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOzo
L. REv. 219, 219-71 (1993).
183 Id.
'14 Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
185 Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1286 (July 30, 2002).
186 Brief for the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health as Amicus Curiae,
Supporting Respondent, Sasse v. Office of the U.S. Attorney, (Sept. 12,2002) (Nos. 02-077 and
02-078), available at http://www.peer.org/docs/dol/scalia-amicusjbrief.pdf.
187 For more on this episode, see Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power-
The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency (unpublished paper, on file with
author), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Unitary%20Executive/kelly-unit_exec-and
_bush.pdf.
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